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Abstract
Since adoption of the Affordable Care Act, hospital concentration has increased across the country, with alarming implications for
healthcare affordability. This paper finds evidence that hospital concentration is associated with increases in tax revenue and
property tax revenue per capita within a city. The relationship between hospital concentration and taxes is strongest in cities with
higher tax revenues, with higher nonprofit ownership shares, and that financially support their hospitals. This paper investigates
two potential mechanisms through which hospital concentration may increase tax revenues within a city—specifically, the effect
of concentration on changes in nonprofit or for-profit hospital ownership and the effect of concentration on capital investments—
failing to find strong supporting evidence for either. Beyond hospital concentration’s role in healthcare price growth across the
country, this paper may provide a starting point for further investigation into the impact of hospital mergers and concentration on
city governments and other actors.

1. INTRODUCTION

government assistance is a pressing one. When tax revenues
decrease, cities must cut public services, including education,

Hospitals, according to Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2015),

food assistance, and public safety. With Jonas (2012)

make up 5.6% of U.S. GDP. Since the passage of the Affordable

calculating that city property tax revenues fell by 3.2% on

Care Act, Schmitt (2017) reports, “there has been a sharp uptick

average and by up to 25% during the Great Recession and with

in hospital mergers, with the number of deals essentially

cities taking a financial hit from coronavirus-related shutdowns,

doubling within three years.” According to Cooper, Craig,

understanding the role of one of the largest industries in the

Gaynor, and van Reenen (2019), merging hospitals are mostly

country and in many cities, hospitals, on municipal finances is

large, well-respected nonprofits and “tend to be located in less

important. If hospital concentration contributes to this trend,

concentrated markets” where they are less likely to draw

policymakers need to know.

antitrust scrutiny. Increased concentration likely strengthens

In this paper, I use a city fixed effects model to study the

hospitals’ negotiating power with insurers, resulting in higher

relationship between hospital concentration and taxes. I identify

rates.

this model based on changes in hospital concentration within a

The impact of hospital concentration on municipal finances
is not well understood. Given that hospital concentration
increases prices for patients and hospitals receive substantial tax
incentives, the question of whether hospitals earn their

city over time, as opposed to differences across cities. Utilizing
panel data on hospital size from 2001 to 2014, I construct a
measure of hospital concentration and system concentration
within each city. With the Lincoln Institute’s fiscally
standardized dataset on municipal finances, I measure the effect

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020

1
1

The Yale Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 1 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 46

SOCIAL
SCIENCES | Health Economics
Social Sciences

YURJ VOL. 1.1 | Sept. 2020

of changes in hospital concentration on tax revenue within a

nonprofit hospitals had next to no effect on property taxes. Next,

city. I then split cities above and below median tax revenues and

I analyze whether hospital construction and expansion explain

median for-profit and nonprofit hospital ownership shares to

changes in capital construction and, through construction, the

gauge which types of cities are powering the relationship

increase in taxes per capita within cities. While my results show

between hospital concentration and taxes. Finally, utilizing a

that increases in HHI statistically significantly reduce various

RAND dataset containing hospital ownership shares and capital

measures of capital construction within cities, I identify no

expenditures across markets, I explore two mechanisms through

relationship between capital expenditures and tax revenue.

which hospital concentration could affect municipal finances:

My paper contributes to the literature by establishing a

changes in ownership status after mergers and capital

relationship, whether causal or not, between hospital

construction.

concentration and city tax revenue. By investigating the

I find evidence that growth in hospital concentration as

repercussions of hospital concentration on city governments as

measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) within a

opposed to healthcare prices, costs, and outcomes, I am

city increases municipal taxes and property taxes per capita. A

contributing novel research to the existing literature and

10% increase in hospital concentration is associated with a

providing a starting point for future investigation.

moderately significant increase in taxes per capita of 1.6%

One limitation of my research is that because including

within a city. Though statistically insignificant, a 10% increase

fixed effects limits my analysis to variation within cities, the city

in HHI corresponds to an approximately 2% increase in property

fixed effects cannot account for time-varying characteristics

tax revenue per capita within a city. That the property tax result

within cities. For example, my city fixed effects model would

is larger than that for all tax revenues combined suggests that

not control for a shock, such as Hurricane Katrina, that affects

changes in property taxes may be driving the relationship

one city’s taxes and economic growth and not others’. Similarly,

between hospital concentration and taxes. System concentration

city fixed effects cannot account for differences in regional

also appears to increase municipal finances. My heterogeneity

economic development. Without supporting evidence for a

analysis reveals that the relationship between hospital

causal pathway through which hospital concentration might

concentration and municipal finances is largest in cities with

increase tax revenue, I cannot verify causation. Another

high taxes and high nonprofit ownership shares.

limitation of my study is that the RAND dataset on hospital

Turning to mechanisms, my analyses fail to support the

capital and ownership status does not encompass all the cities in

hypothesis that changes in the for-profit or nonprofit hospital

the Lincoln Institute data and the city definitions differ slightly,

share are responsible for the positive relationship between HHI

making comparisons across the two datasets imperfect.

and tax revenue per capita within a city. Instead, I find that only
growth in the government-run hospital share increases tax
revenue, which may be a case of reverse causality. Because
cities can tax for-profit hospitals, I anticipated a positive
relationship between the for-profit ownership share and
property taxes per capita. Surprisingly, I find that a 10%
increase in the share of for-profit hospitals corresponds to a
2.3% decrease in property tax revenue, whereas the share of
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2. Literature Review
Research shows that hospital consolidation raises prices on
consumers. Applying difference-in-differences to health
insurance claims data, Cooper et al. (2019) discovered that
“prices increased by over 6% when the merging hospitals were
geographically close (e.g., 5 miles or less apart), but not when
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3. DATA DESCRIPTION

apart).” Alarmingly, Dafny (2009) found that non-merging
hospitals respond to the merger of their rivals by increasing their
own prices by up to 40%. Comparing insurer and hospital
concentration, Melnick, Shen, and Wu (2011) determined that
hospital concentration raises prices for consumers while insurer
concentration lowers prices. Unfortunately for consumers, 90%
of hospitals operate in markets wherein hospital concentration
exceeds insurance plan concentration. Hospitals get away with
price increases because consumers “choose hospitals largely
ignoring the hospital’s price,” according to Garmon (2013).
Hospitals, especially nonprofit ones, receive substantial

3.1) Hospital Merger Data
Cooper et al.’s “The Price Ain’t Right” (2019) contains a
hospital merger dataset with the ownership status of 2,358 out
of 3,272 hospitals in the American Hospital Association (AHA)
from 2001 to 2014. These publicly-available data include
system affiliation, latitude and longitude, and hospital bed
count. The authors’ unique location and system identifiers made
possible the calculation of market concentration using HHI.
3.2) Lincoln Institute Data
Founded in 1946, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

government support. By exempting nonprofit hospitals from
“federal income tax, state income
tax, state and local sales taxes, and
local

property

tax,”

nonprofit

hospitals received a subsidy of
$24.6 billion in 2011, Rosenbaum et
al. (2015) estimated. In response to
calls to increase their community
benefit

spending,

nonprofit

hospitals, which make up 47% of all

maintains

“With many municipalities in
financial trouble thanks to
coronavirus and critics questioning
hospitals’ community benefit
spending, understanding the effect
of hospital concentration on
municipal finances is an important
policy concern.”

US hospitals, according to the American Hospital Association,
raised their community benefit spending from 7.6% of operating
expenses in 2010 to 8.1% in 2014, Young et al. (2018)
calculated. Herring et al. (2018) found that “incremental
community benefit spending”—how much more nonprofit
hospitals spend on charity care and community benefit
programs than for-profit hospitals—exceeded the tax exemption
for only 62% of nonprofit hospitals.
As nonprofit hospitals consolidate and raise prices, they
continue to receive substantial tax breaks. With many
municipalities in financial trouble thanks to coronavirus and
critics questioning hospitals’ community benefit spending,
understanding the effect of hospital concentration on municipal

a

dataset,

“Fiscally

Standardized Cities,” on the finances
of 150 American cities from 1977 to
2016, including tax revenues and
expenditures. I have limited my
analysis to the 147 cities with at least
one hospital in the Cooper et al.
(2019) dataset and the period 20012014 to match Cooper et al.’s (2019).
For the purposes of this paper, I

use only 20 measures encompassing taxes, revenues, and
spending. All values are per capita, enabling straightforward
comparisons across cities. Because some city jurisdictions may
overlap with county governments, the Lincoln Institute created
fiscally standardized (FiSC) indicators by “adding together
revenues and expenditures for the city government plus an
appropriate share from overlying counties, school districts, and
special districts…based on a city’s share of county population,
the percentage of students in each school district that live in the
central city, and the city’s share of the estimated population
served by each special district,” according to Langley (2016). I
will be restricting my analysis to FiSC variables to sidestep
complications with overlapping government jurisdictions. This

finances is an important policy concern.
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is a widely-accepted practice for research across cities with

market with n hospitals, its HHI is the sum of each hospital’s

variable governmental structures. The IMF’s Jiri Jonas (2012)

market share, si, squared:

used a similar “constructed cities” method to estimate the costs
of the Great Recession on local governments and other
researchers, including Chernick and Reschovsky (2017), have
used the Lincoln Institute’s dataset for papers in the Journal of
Urban Affairs, for the Pew Charitable Trust, and for the Federal

Any measure of hospital concentration that ignores hospital
systems is likely to understate market concentration. Thus,
within each city, I grouped hospitals by system to calculate
system market share. For a market with N systems,

Reserve.
3.3) RAND Market-Level Hospital Data
Using CMS Medicare cost reports, the RAND Corporation
compiled metrics on hospital profits, costs, ownership status,

Using hospital system market share, I calculated system HHI

and more. RAND aggregates the data at hospital, county,
market, and state levels. To facilitate comparisons across
Lincoln Institute and RAND measures, I have opted for marketlevel indicators. 115 markets in the RAND dataset match,

4.2) City Fixed Effects Model

imperfectly, cities in the Lincoln data. Unlike the Lincoln
Institute data, RAND market indicators may not be confined to

To estimate the effect of hospital concentration on taxes and

city limits. However, as an approximation, RAND markets and

property taxes per capita, I employed a city fixed effects model

Lincoln cities are useful. Because the Lincoln Institute compiles

with standard errors clustered by city and year controls. Fixed

its data on a per-capita basis, I calculated population-weighted

effects isolate the impact of a change in one indicator on another

averages for Lincoln Institute cities to create matching,

within a city over time, holding all other time-invariant, city

aggregated “markets” in cases where RAND lists several cities

characteristics equal:

under one market name, such as “Los Angeles-Long BeachAnaheim, CA.”

4. RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1) Creating Measures of HHI and System HHI

The coefficient of interest, 1, captures the effect of the
independent variable X—the logarithm of HHI, system HHI, or
another variable—on the dependent variable Y—the logarithm
of a measure of municipal finances such as tax revenue per
capita. I scaled my estimates such that the coefficient represents

HHI is a measure of market concentration used in the

the effect of an approximately 10% change in HHI. Year fixed

academic literature and by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in

effects control for trends across time, such as overall changes in

antitrust cases. The DOJ considers markets with HHI scores

tax revenues across time resulting from macroeconomic events

between 0 and 1,500 un-concentrated, between 1,500 and 2,500

unrelated to hospital concentration. All standard errors are

moderately concentrated, and between 2,500 and 10,000 highly

clustered at the city level to account for serial correlation in the

concentrated. This paper uses hospital beds, as compiled in

estimates of a city over time. Results are weighted by city

Cooper et al. (2019), as a proxy for market share. For a given

population because city populations vary from a low of 16,000
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5.2) Hospital Concentration and Taxes
Table 2 displays my primary estimates of the relationship
between HHI and taxes.

A city fixed effects model does not inherently demonstrate
causality but is usually more accurate than simple regressions
across cities because it discards cross-city variation in financial
structure. Small cities tend to have more concentrated hospital
sectors than large cities and tax residents less. Taking an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression across small and large
cities, therefore, is likely to find that taxes and hospital sectors
are negatively correlated. A city fixed effects regression, by
contrast, isolates the impact of hospital concentration on taxes
within a city over time.

5. RESULTS
Table 1 reports my summary statistics.

The estimates in column 1 come from an OLS regression
between HHI and taxes per capita across cities. Column 2 adds
the results of a fixed effects regression between HHI and tax
revenues per capita. Column 3 displays the estimates of the OLS
regression between system HHI and taxes. Column 4 exhibits
the fixed effects results of system HHI and taxes. Columns 5
through 8 do the same for HHI and property taxes per capita.

Most cities have highly concentrated hospital sectors, with

Although the OLS regression across cities suggests a

a mean HHI and mean system HHI of 4,661 and 5,306,

negative relationship between hospital concentration (HHI) and

respectively—well above the DOJ threshold of 2,500. Because

taxes per capita, the fixed effects model, which examines

systems own multiple hospitals, system HHI logically exceeds

variation within a city and accounts for time effects, shows a

HHI.

positive and moderately significant relationship between HHI
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and taxes per capita: a 10% increase in HHI is associated with

2% increase in taxes per capita. In cities with below-median

an approximately 1.6% increase in taxes per capita. Whereas the

taxation, the effect of HHI on taxes is slightly negative and

OLS regression captures that small cities tend to have

statistically insignificant. Likewise, Table 3 shows that above-

concentrated hospital sectors and low rates of taxation, fixed

median taxed cities are powering the positive relationship

effects indicate that an increase in hospital concentration within

between HHI and property taxes I observe in Table 3. In high-

a city is associated with a decrease in taxes per capita. Similarly,

taxed cities, a 10% increase in HHI is associated with an

the movement from across-city variation to within-city variation

approximately 2.6% increase in property taxes per capita. In

flips the direction of the impact of system HHI on taxes per

less-taxed cities, HHI has no effect on taxes or property taxes.

capita from negative to positive.

Treating taxes as an imperfect indicator of a city’s wealth or tax

Though far from conclusive, the property tax results imply

base—since cities with higher per capita incomes can afford to

that HHI and property taxes per capita are positively correlated,

tax their residents more—Table 3 illustrates that hospital

with a 10% increase in HHI associated with a roughly 2%

concentration has a larger impact on tax revenue in prosperous

increase in property tax revenues. The correlation between

cities.

system HHI and property taxes is slightly positive and

In the following analyses, I investigate whether a city’s

statistically insignificant.

share of nonprofit hospitals affects my treatment effects. In

5.3) Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Table 4, I start by calculating the average of each city’s

In this section, I examine which types of cities are driving

nonprofit ownership share over the study period and then divide

the relationship between hospital concentration and tax

cities into subsets depending on whether they are above or

revenues. I find that cities with higher taxes, with higher

below the median city’s for-profit share, allowing me to discern

nonprofit ownership shares, and that support their hospitals

whether cities with higher or lower nonprofit ownership account

financially exhibit more substantial relationships between

for the relationship between HHI and taxes.

hospital concentration and taxes.
The relationship between HHI, on the one hand, and taxes
and property taxes, on the other, is the most positive and most
statistically significant in cities with the highest tax revenues.
To determine which cities account for the relationship between
HHI and taxes per capita, I take each city’s average tax revenue
over the study period and then organize cities above and below
the median average tax revenue over the study period. In Table
3, I test HHI’s relationship with taxes and property taxes above
and below the median.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 display the results of my fixed
effects regression of HHI and taxes per capita in below-median
and above-median taxed cities, respectively. Columns 3 and 4
do the same for HHI and property taxes. In high-taxed cities, a
10% increase in HHI corresponds to a statistically significant

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
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Though the share of nonprofit hospitals is not the inverse of
the share of for-profit hospitals thanks to the existence of
government-run hospitals, the results for nonprofit and forprofit hospitals mirror each other. Cities with a higher share of
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concentration and taxes. In Table 4, the relationship between

that never supported their hospitals. In cities that have supported

hospital concentration and taxes is statistically insignificant

their hospitals financially, a 10% increase in HHI is associated

above and below the median nonprofit ownership share.

with a moderately significant 1.7% increase in taxes and a

However, the coefficient for HHI and taxes is seemingly more

statistically insignificant 2% increase in property taxes. The

positive in cities with above-median nonprofit ownership

relationship between HHI and taxes per capita in cities that have

shares, with a 10% increase in HHI corresponding to a 1.5%

never supported their hospitals financially is both statistically

increase in above-median nonprofit cities. Likewise, HHI and

insignificant and less positive, with a 10% increase in HHI

property tax revenue per capita are more positively related in

resulting in a statistically insignificant 1% increase in taxes and

cities with above-median nonprofit ownership shares: a 10%

a statistically significant 1.1% increase in property taxes. Thus,

increase in HHI is associated with a roughly 3% increase in

the relationship between HHI and tax revenues appears largest

property tax revenue in cities with above-median nonprofit

in cities that have supported their hospitals financially than

ownership.

within those that have not.

Given that cities with higher tax revenues exhibit a larger

These results reveal that the effect of HHI on taxes and

association between hospital concentration and taxes, the extent

property taxes is stronger in some cities than in others. In cities

to which cities direct revenue to hospitals may reinforce the

with higher tax revenues per capita, my results point to a

relationship between city finances and hospital concentration.

statistically significant, positive relationship between HHI, on

To explore whether city government spending patterns affect

one side, and taxes and property taxes, on the other. In cities

this relationship, I split cities in Table 5 by whether or not they

with a higher nonprofit hospital share and lower for-profit

have ever supported their hospitals financially through direct

hospital ownership share, HHI and tax revenues are more

hospital payments.

positively related. Finally, in cities that support their hospitals
financially, the relationship between HHI and tax revenues is
more positive.
These findings are likely interdependent since cities with
lower for-profit shares also tend to have higher taxes, the OLS
results in Tables 6 and 7 show. Cities with higher tax revenues
are more likely to spend across a wide variety of items,
including direct payments to hospitals. That the relationship
between hospital concentration and municipal finances is
strongest in cities with higher taxes, lower for-profit shares, and
higher spending on hospitals may stem from these cities having
more mechanisms through which hospital concentration can

Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 display my estimates for the

affect municipal finances. In a city with low tax revenues and

relationship between HHI and measures of tax revenue for the

low spending, it is possible that any change in the relative

91 cities that financially supported their hospitals between 2001

concentration of that city’s hospital sector is less likely to

and 2014. Columns 2 and 4 contain estimates for the 56 cities

influence its finances because the city lacks the mechanisms,
including direct hospital payments, to register such a change.
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5.4) Mechanisms

run hospitals and taxes. Growth in the nonprofit or for-profit

In this section, I attempt to identify a mechanism through

market share has a negligible impact on tax revenue. Only the

which hospital concentration impacts city taxes. The two

share of government-run hospitals is statistically significantly

mechanisms I explore are: (1) changes in the share of for-profit,

associated with tax revenue per capita: a 10% increase in the

nonprofit, or government hospitals and (2) changes in hospitals’

government share corresponds to an approximately 2.2%

capital expenditures. For the first, it is possible that growth in

increase in tax revenues within a city. This may be a case of

the for-profit hospital share could increase tax revenues since
cities can tax for-profit hospitals. For the second, growth in
hospitals’ capital expenditures could signal that hospitals are
purchasing land or building new facilities, which could alter a
city’s property tax base. If a nonprofit hospital buys land, for
example, a city’s property tax base would contract because it
cannot tax land owned by nonprofits. Since 30% of cities’ tax
revenues come from property taxes in 2017, according to the
Tax Policy Center, any change, including hospital ownership
status, that affects a city’s property tax base could have a
measurable impact on its revenue generation. I fail to find
supporting

evidence

for

either

mechanism.

Only

the

government hospital share has a positive and statistically
significant effect on taxes, while the shares of nonprofit and for-

reverse causality, though: to operate government-run hospital

profit hospitals have negligible impacts. Instead of finding an

systems, governments need more revenue.

association between capital expenditures and tax revenues, my

Because nonprofit hospitals are exempt from property

estimates imply that capital expenditures correspond to a

taxes, it is possible that nonprofit and for-profit consolidation

decrease in hospital concentration and are not significantly

have divergent effects on property tax revenue. Hence, the

related to tax revenue.

negative coefficient of for-profit hospital ownership on property

Because nonprofit hospitals are exempt from property

taxes is surprising.

taxes, it is worth exploring whether growth in the nonprofit
hospital sector impacts municipal finances. To do this, I run city
fixed effects regressions of RAND’s measures of nonprofit, forprofit, and government ownership on tax data taken from the
Lincoln Institute in Table 6.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 present results from an OLS
and a city fixed effects regression, respectively, of nonprofit
ownership share on tax revenue per capita. Columns 3 and 4 do
the same for the share of for-profit hospitals on taxes. Columns
5 and 6 add the results of the relationship between government-
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revenues. If hospital concentration were expanding construction
As Table 7 illustrates, growth in the market share of for-

and construction were then raising tax revenues by increasing

profit hospitals within a city is associated with a statistically

property values or incomes, then I could identify a possible

significant decrease in property taxes per capita. I found that a

causal mechanism.

10% increase in the for-profit share corresponds to a decrease in

On the first count, Table 8 shows that HHI is associated

property taxes of roughly 2.3%. Because cities can tax land

with reductions in hospital capital, a combination of capital-

owned by for-profit hospitals, growth in the for-profit share may

related buildings and fixtures, total fixed assets, and capital-

expand a city’s property tax base. With a broader tax base, a

related costs.

city’s tax burden may be spread more evenly across the

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 feature OLS and fixed effects

population, possibly resulting in lower property taxes per capita.

regression results of HHI on measures of hospital capital.

Growth in the nonprofit share of hospitals within a city has

Columns 3 and 4 do the same for system HHI and measures of

virtually no impact on property tax revenues. A 10% increase in

capital. As the fixed effects results in Table 8 illustrate, a 10%

the government ownership share, by contrast, increases property

increase in HHI within a city corresponds to a significant 8.3%

tax revenue by approximately 4.2%, a result that is statistically
significant at the 1% level. This, too, is likely a case of reverse
causality: to fund government hospital systems, cities need
higher property taxes. It is worth noting that growth in the forprofit hospital share has a significantly more negative effect on
property tax revenues than does an increase in the nonprofit
hospital share.
Additionally, with the RAND dataset, I examined whether
HHI affected capital expenditures, which could suggest that
consolidation breeds construction. I next checked whether
increases in capital expenditures within a city impacted tax
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decrease in various measures of capital. Likewise, increases in

controls—the logarithms of capital-related buildings and

system consolidation appear to be weakly associated with

fixtures, capital-related costs, and total fixed assets—to my

falling capital costs within a city.

fixed effects regression, in Table 11. Because only the RAND

When I separate these measures of capital in Table 9, I also
find that HHI reduces capital costs and expenditures.
With a statistical significance of less than 1%, a 10%

dataset contains measures of capital, the results in Table 11 are
not directly comparable to those in Table 2 based on the Lincoln
data.

increase in HHI is associated with a 4% decrease in capitalrelated costs. Though statistically insignificant, growth in
system HHI also appears to reduce capital-related costs.
Together, Tables 8 and 9 demonstrate that HHI has a
significantly negative impact on capital expenditures and costs.
On the second count, however, Table 10 identifies no
significant relationship between various measures of capital
expenditures and taxes or property taxes.

Columns 1 and 2 display the results of fixed effects
regressions of HHI on taxes per capita without and with capital
controls, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 add the results for
property taxes without and with capital controls. Unlike Table
2, I find no statistically significant relationship between HHI
and taxes or property taxes in Table 11. However, like my
previous results, Table 11 highlights a positive, though
statistically insignificant, relationship between HHI and the two
measures of tax revenue. More importantly, adding capital
controls hardly budges my fixed effects results and standard
errors, signaling that changes in capital expenditures do not
explain the positive association between hospital concentration
The estimates in columns 1 and 2 come from OLS and fixed

and taxes.

effects regressions, respectively, of measures of capital costs

Although I was unable to conclusively identify a

and expenditures and taxes per capita. Columns 3 and 4 do the

mechanism to explain the positive relationship between HHI

same for capital measures on property taxes. None of the

and taxes per capita, I can rule out two hypotheses. The first

estimates is large or statistically significant.

hypothesis which my analysis could not corroborate was that

To further investigate whether changes in capital

hospital ownership status was responsible for the positive

expenditures act as a causal mechanism for hospital

relationship between hospital concentration and tax revenues

concentration to affect taxes and property taxes, I add capital

within a city. The second hypothesis that we can discard is that,

YURJ | yurj.yale.edu
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as hospitals invested in making improvements and purchased

relationship with taxes than system HHI may be a sign that

more real estate, they drove up property values and thereby

growth in hospital size as measured by beds, not hospital system

increased property tax revenues. Instead, I found no significant

consolidation, is responsible for the association between

relationship between various measures of capital construction

hospital concentration and municipal finances.

and tax revenues. Simultaneously, I found a significantly

Through my heterogeneous treatment effects analysis, I

negative relationship between hospital concentration and capital

determined that cities with higher tax bases and those that

costs, indicating that increases in HHI may stem from closing

supported their hospitals financially exhibited stronger positive

competitor hospitals, which would decrease the footprint of

relationships between hospital concentration and tax revenues

hospitals in a city, or that hospitals, contrary to industry claims,

per capita, reinforcing the idea that cities with higher taxes and

invest less on capital improvements in the wake of

cities that spend on a broader scale are more likely to register

consolidation. Future research might untangle through which

changes in hospital concentration than those with low taxes and

mechanism growth in HHI is connected to decreases in capital

low spending.

expenditures.

My investigation of two possible mechanisms through which
hospital concentration could impact municipal tax revenues—

6. CONCLUSION

first, changes in ownership status and, second, changes in
capital costs and expenditures—came up empty. Lacking

Using city fixed effects regressions on hospitals and

concrete evidence of a mechanism, I am reluctant to declare

municipal finances in 147 American cities from 2001 to 2014

that hospital concentration causes tax revenues per capita to

and controlling for time effects, I found a statistically significant

increase within a city. However, my results suggest that

relationship between hospital concentration and tax revenues

changes in tax revenue are associated with changes in hospital

per capita within cities. A 10% increase in hospital

consolidation within a city. Future research should investigate

concentration was associated with an approximately 1.6%

possible mechanisms for the relationship between hospital

increase in tax revenues per capita within a city. Although

concentration and taxes, potentially confirming a causal

statistically insignificant, HHI and property tax revenue per

relationship, and investigate why hospital concentration

capita appear to be positively correlated, with a 10% increase in

correlates to reductions in capital costs and expenditures.

HHI associated with a 2% increase in property tax revenue per
capita.
Since adoption of the Affordable Care Act, hospital systems
have driven the nationwide trend in hospital consolidation,
according to Cooper et al. (2019). Nevertheless, compared to the
relationship between HHI and taxes, that between system HHI
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